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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930164-CA 
V* : 
SHEILA J. SHIPLER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's 
motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Has defendant failed to establish that she is 
entitled to have her third degree felony conviction reduced to a 
misdemeanor, where she clearly did not meet the requirements of 
the statute in effect on the date she claims to have qualified 
for such a reduction? 
The trial court did not reach this issue. This Court 
"may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper grounds, 
even though the trial court assigned another reason for its 
ruling." State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the 
reduction statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2) (b) (1990), did 
not authorize reduction of defendant's third degree felony 
conviction to a misdemeanor because imposition of the specified 
felony sentence was not stayed? 
The interpretation of a statute is a conclusion of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 
360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990): 
(1) If the court, having regard to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to 
the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes that it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that 
category of offense established by statute 
and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that 
offense, the court may, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law, enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower 
category of offense and impose sentence 
accordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, 
the conviction shall be deemed to be a 
misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates the sentence 
to be for a misdemeanor and the sentence 
imposed is within the limits provided by law 
for a misdemeanor; or 
(b) The imposition of the sentence is 
stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation, whether committed to jail as a 
condition of probation or not, and he is 
thereafter discharged without violating his 
probation. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungement of 
his record as provided by law. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1993): 
(1) If the court, having regard to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to 
the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record 
the conviction as being for that degree of 
offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the 
court may unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree 
felony the conviction is considered to be for 
a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence 
to be for a class A misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits 
provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b)(i) the imposition of the sentence is 
stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation, whether committed to jail as a 
condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently 
discharged without violating his probation; 
and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice 
to the prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if 
requested by either party or the court, finds 
it is in the interest of justice that the 
conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one 
degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or 
on the court record that the offense may be 
reduced two degrees. In no case may an 
offense be reduced under this section by more 
than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to 
preclude any person from obtaining or being 
granted an expungement of his record as 
provided by law. 
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Any other relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of theft as 
second degree felonies and one count of theft as a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant entered a 
guilty plea to one count of theft as a second degree felony on 
October 22, 1990 (R. 20-21). The remaining theft counts were 
dismissed (R. 20-21) . 
Prior to the imposition of sentence, defendant filed a 
motion for judgment of conviction for the next lower category of 
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990) (R. 29). The 
trial court granted defendant's motion and imposed sentence for a 
third degree felony offense on November 21, 1990, sentencing 
defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 30). 
The trial court then suspended defendant's prison term and placed 
her on a 36-month term of probation (R. 30-31, attached at 
Addendum A). 
On April 29, 1991 an amendment to section 76-3-402 
became effective, which amendment precluded reduction by more 
than one degree without the prosecutor's consent. Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-3-402(3) (Supp. 1993).l 
1
 For convenience and because the current version of the 
statute was adopted in 1991, the State references the Court 
solely to Utah Code Ann. 76-3-402 (Supp. 1993). 
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Based on information from Adult Probation and Parole 
(AP&P) that defendant had satisfied all special conditions of her 
probation, and AP&P's further recommendation that defendant's 
probation be terminated as successful, the trial court terminated 
defendant's probation on October 17, 1991, twenty five months 
early (R. 35). Thereafter, on December 23, 1992, defendant filed 
a motion to reduce her third degree felony conviction to a 
misdemeanor (R. 36-37, attached at Addendum B). The State filed 
an objection and memorandum (R. 47-54, attached at Addendum C). 
Following a hearing on the matter (R. 83-93, attached 
at Addendum D), the trial court concluded section 76-3-402 "[did] 
not authorize reducing defendant's conviction to a misdemeanor," 
and denied the motion (R. 56-7, attached at Addendum E). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to the issues raised on appeal are 
adequately set forth in the Statement of the Case, supra. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not eligible to move the trial court to 
reduce her third degree felony conviction to a misdemeanor under 
the reduction statute. The statute sets forth express 
preconditions for accrual of eligibility for reduction which 
defendant was not able to fulfill prior to the effective date of 
the 1991 amendments. Thus, this case is controlled by the 
amended version of the statute which precludes reduction by more 
than one degree without the prosecutor's consent. As defendant 
previously benefitted by a one-degree reduction at the time of 
5 
sentencing (from a second to a third degree felony), she is not 
entitled to any further reduction under the statute without the 
prosecutor's consent. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant fails to 
demonstrate that she is entitled to reduction under either 
version of the statute. Under Utah law, a trial court can either 
withhold sentence by staying its imposition or by staying 
execution of a sentence already imposed. The plain language of 
both versions of the reduction statute requires a stay in the 
imposition of the sentence, instead of a stay in the execution of 
the sentence. Here, the trial court first imposed the specified 
sentence for a third degree felony, and then suspended execution 
of that sentence and placed defendant on probation. Because the 
imposition of sentence was not stayed, the trial court correctly 
concluded that under the plain terms of the statute, defendant 
was not entitled to have her third degree felony conviction 
reduced to a misdemeanor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SHE HAS A 
VESTED RIGHT TO HAVE HER THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
CONVICTION REDUCED TO A MISDEMEANOR UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990) 
Defendant broadly asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to reduce her third degree felony conviction to a class 
B misdemeanor. Br. of Appellant at 11. In so arguing, defendant 
asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2) (b) (1990) controls the 
6 
issue as the statute in effect at the time her sentence was 
imposed. Br. of Appellant at 10 n.2. 
Defendant's assertion fails to recognize the statute's 
express preconditions for accrual of eligibility for reduction. 
As defendant was not able to fulfill these preconditions prior to 
the effective date of the 1991 amendments to the statute, she was 
not eligible to move for a reduction under the 1990 version of 
section 76-3-402(2) (b); consequently, she has no vested right to 
reduction thereunder. 
This case is controlled by the amended version of the 
statute which precludes reduction by more than one degree without 
the consent of the prosecutor, see section 76-3-402(3) (Supp. 
1993), which was not given here (R. 47-54), see Addendum C. 
Defendant previously benefitted from a one degree reduction (from 
a second to a third degree felony) at the time of sentencing; 
thus, she is ineligible for another reduction without the 
prosecutor's consent. 
A. The Amended Version of Section 76-3-402 
(Supp. 1993) Applies As the Statute in Effect 
at the Time Defendant's Alleged Right to 
Reduction Accrued2 
No person "has a vested right in any rule of law." 
Berrv ex rel. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 
1985) . Further, impairment of vested rights only occurs when 
2
 The reasoning underlying the State's analysis was 
originally and more fully set forth in the State's responsive in 
State v. Ball, Court of Appeals Case No. 920786-CA, filed July 
16, 1993. The Ball brief discusses the eligibility requirements 
for expungement under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-2 (1990 & Supp. 
1992). 
7 
rights have accrued to the benefit of a particular person. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). Defendant 
relies on statutory provisions repealed prior to the date of her 
motion. Accordingly, in order to prevail she must show that she 
obtained a vested right to a reduction of her conviction under 
the 1990 version. Otherwise, the amended version of section 76-
3-402 (Supp. 1993), applies as the statute in effect at the time 
defendant's cause of action accrued, applies. See Department of 
Social Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); Marshall 
v. Indus. Comm'n., 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985) (setting forth 
general rule that the substantive law in effect at the time the 
action is initiated applies).3 
There are no cases in Utah identifying the point at 
which eligibility for offense reduction vests. However, the 
determination of vesting in other contexts demonstrates that 
rights only accrue when fundamental conditions necessary for 
maintaining an action are fulfilled. See Gay Hill Field Serv. v. 
Board of Review, 750 P.2d 606, 609-10 (Utah App. 1988) (where 
controlling statute requires filing of particular document, cause 
of action accrues at time condition is fulfilled); Payne v. 
3
 A determination of whether a party's rights have 
accrued, or vested under a particular statute frequently arises 
in conjunction with a claim that the statute has been 
retroactively applied so as to impair the party's rights. Ibid. 
However, retroactivity is not at issue here. The question before 
the Court is not whether the amended statute can be applied 
retroactively to defendant, but whether defendant's alleged right 
to a reduction under section 76-3-402(2) (b) accrued prior to the 
effective date of the 1991 amendments or, as the State believes, 
after it. 
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Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 1987) (all conditions for 
maintenance of suit must be fulfilled before accrual of 
negligence cause of action); but see Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co. 
v. Sherwood Assoc. 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah App. 1990) (rights 
and duties of parties to a contract become fixed at the time the 
contract is entered). 
In light of this principle it is frequently stated that 
a right vests or accrues when the party claiming the right can 
first maintain an action in court. Payne. 743 P.2d at 189 
(negligence action accrues "when the plaintiff[s] could first 
have maintained [their] action to a successful result," quoting 1 
Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 88 (1962)); Silver King Coalition Mines Co. 
v. Indus. Comm'n.. 2 Utah 2d. 1, 268 P.2d 689, 692 (1954) 
(dependent's cause of action under worker's compensation arises 
at time of worker's death); Gay Hill. 750 P.2d at 609 (cause of 
action "accrues at the time it becomes remediable in the 
courts"); State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Fork. 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 
P.2d 575, 577 (1940) (right to recover taxes arises not at the 
point at which defendant should have filed its return, but at the 
date of actual filing).4 
Defendant has not demonstrated the necessary conditions 
precedent to establishing a vested right to reduction under the 
4
 Upon closer examination the Gav Hill and Spanish Fork 
cases are merely special applications of the general rule. In 
each case the party claiming the right to bring suit was not on 
notice or otherwise enabled to bring suit until the required 
reports were filed or completed. Gav Hill. 750 P.2d at 610; 
Spanish Fork. 100 P.2d at 577. 
9 
1990 version of section 76-3-402(2)(b). Both the 1990 and 
amended versions of the reduction statute require fulfillment of 
specific conditions before one is eligible for reduction under 
subsection (2)(b). These conditions include: a stay in the 
imposition of sentence, placement on probation, as well as the 
successful completion of that probationary term. Section 76-3-
402(2) (b) (1990 & Supp. 1993). Additionally, the amended version 
clarifies the necessity of a "motion and notice to the 
prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either party 
or the court," as well as a finding from the court that reduction 
"is in the interest of justice." Section 76-3-402(2) (b) (iii) 
(Supp. 1993). 
Even assuming defendant could demonstrate that the 
imposition of her sentence was stayed for purposes of the 
statute,5 the additional requirement of a violation-free 
probationary term is not capable of determination until the term 
expires or is terminated by the court. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(9) (Supp. 1993) (probation may be terminated at the 
discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 
set term). It follows that defendant was not even eligible to 
move the court for reduction prior to the completion of her 
probationary term on October 17, 1991 (R. 35), six months after 
the effective date of the 1991 amendments to the statute. See 
Amendment Notes, section 76-3-402 (Supp. 1993). 
5
 The State's argument that imposition of defendant's 
third degree felony sentence was not stayed within the meaning of 
section 76-3-402(2) (b), is set forth in Point II of this brief. 
10 
The conditions for reduction in subsection (2)(b) 
constitute the bases by which a defendant moving for reduction 
establishes that the right to bring an action for reduction has 
accrued. In other types of actions, referenced in the cases 
cited above, see Br. of Appellee at 8-10, and in defendant's 
brief, see Br. of Appellant at 10 n.2,6 the determination of a 
cause of action is based on "historical" facts bearing on the 
relevant events. See State v. Abevta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 
1993) (finding that the defendant had a vested right in the 
substantive law governing his right to withdraw his guilty plea, 
a question whose factual determinants were ascertainable from 
only the events surrounding his plea). 
However, an action for reduction under section 76-3-
402(2)(b) does not rely entirely on "historical" facts which may 
or may not be subsequently determined by the court to support a 
cause of action. Rather, a motion for reduction is a 
"contemporary" action in which the movant's cause of action is 
not even established until he or she can demonstrate a legally 
sufficient present status, i.e., one whose sentence has been 
stayed and probationary term successfully completed. Id.. Thus, 
the right to reduction under subsection (2)(b) of the statute 
does not even accrue until the existence of this status has been 
established, for it is patent that a probationer who violates the 
6
 See, e.g., Harris v. Smith. 541 P.2d 343, 344 (Utah 
1975) State v. Miller. 464 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1970); Belt v. 
Turner. 483 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1971) (setting forth general rule 
that law in effect at time of sentencing governs). 
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terms of probation will not be eligible under subsection (2)(b) 
to have his or her conviction reduced. Id..7 
In essence, defendant had only a mere expectancy that 
the 1990 version of section 76-3-402(2)(b) would provide relief 
if her cause of action accrued before the statute was amended. 
See Silver King. 268 P.2d at 692 (flIt is often said that a right 
is not 'vested' unless it is something more than such a mere 
expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuation of 
the present laws.11); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 586 (Utah 
1983) (ex post facto clause did not preclude application of newly 
7
 A comparison to the analogous requirements for 
expungement under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-2(1) (1990 & Supp. 1993) 
is helpful. See p. 8, n.2, supra. The 1990 version of the 
reduction statute expressly cross-references to the expungement 
statute. See Cross-References, section 76-3-402 (1990). 
Expungement, like reduction, requires the fulfillment of certain 
conditions prior to maintaining an expungement petition. 
In particular, the expungement statute requires a clean 
record, which can only be determined as of the filing of the 
petition for expungement. Section 77-18-2(1). The clean record 
requirement is a condition which precedes consideration of the 
expungement petition. Persons lacking a clean record are "not 
eligible for expungement of any . . . offenses regardless of type 
or degree of offense." Section 77-18-2(1)(b). The eligibility 
determination thus denies expungement to any "person who at the 
time of petition for expungement has two or more convictions . . 
. tor] a previously expunged [criminal record]." Id. (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, eligibility for expungement must 
necessarily "be determined as of the date of the petition." 
People v. McCloud. 139 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); 
State v. Tullv. 376 A.2d 194, 195-96 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977) 
(rejecting petitioner's claim that an irreversible right to 
expungement arose at completion of minimum time requirement). In 
short, a petitioner has no vested right to expungement prior to 
the filing of the expungement petition. McCloud, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
at 323 (fixing eligibility for expungement at the time of 
petition). 
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enacted resentencing statute where defendant's "expectancy" in 
the former statute did not accrue into a perfected defense before 
the amendment took place), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), 
overruled on other grounds. State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 427 
(Utah 1986). Because defendant's probationary term was not 
successfully completed prior to the effective date of the 1991 
amendments, defendant's expectation of relief never matured into 
a vested right in the reduction proceedings provided for under 
the 1990 version of section 76-3-402(2)(b). 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's cause of action is 
controlled by the amended version of the statute which was in 
effect at the time her cause of action accrued. Even assuming 
defendant was otherwise eligible for reduction under subsection 
(2) (b) (i-iii),8 she would still not be entitled to reduction 
under subsection (3) which precludes reduction by more than one 
degree without the prosecutor's consent. As defendant had 
previously benefitted from a one degree reduction at the time of 
sentencing, she was not entitled to another reduction without the 
prosecutor's consent, which was not give here (R. 47-54), see 
Addendum C. Therefore, trial court's ruling was correct and 
should be affinned. 
B. The Court May Affirm on Any Reasonable Ground 
Although the prosecutor advanced this argument below 
(R. 84-91), see Addendum D, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion for another reason (R. 56-57) , see Addendum E, to be 
8
 See n.5, supra. 
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discussed in Point II of this brief. The Court may affirm the 
trial court's decision on either ground. See State v. Bryan. 709 
P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) (appellate court may affirm lower 
court's decision on any proper ground, even if lower court 
assigned another reason for its ruling). 
POINT II 
THE IMPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY SENTENCE WAS NOT STAYED FOR PURPOSES 
OF EITHER VERSION OF THE REDUCTION STATUTE; 
THUS, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HER 
CONVICTION REDUCED TO A MISDEMEANOR 
Defendant has not demonstrated that the imposition of 
her third degree felony sentence was stayed; consequently, 
defendant fails to demonstrate that she is entitled to have her 
third degree felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under 
either version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990 & Supp. 
1993) . 
A. Imposition of Sentence Below 
In denying defendant's motion to reduce her third 
degree felony conviction to a misdemeanor, the trial court found: 
1. That on October 22, 1990, the defendant 
entered a plea of "guilty" to the charge of 
Theft, a second degree felony; 
2. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant 
was sentenced as a third-degree felony, 
pursuant to the provisions of § 76-3-402(1), 
Utah Code Ann. (1990), to serve, inter alia, 
the statutory term of zero-to-five years 
incarceration at the Utah State Prison; 
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3. That on November 19, 1990, the Court 
suspended the imposition of sentence9 and 
placed the defendant on probation; and 
4. That on October 17, 1991, the Court 
terminated the defendant's probation as 
successful without violation. 
(R. 56-7), see Addendum E. Based on the foregoing findings, the 
trial court concluded: "[section] 76-3-402(2)(b), Utah Code Ann. 
(1990), does not authorize reducing defendant's conviction to a 
misdemeanor because the imposed sentence was executed10 by the 
Court" (R. 57), see Addendum E. While the trial court's ruling 
could have been articulated more precisely, it is a correct 
interpretation of the statute and should be affirmed. 
9
 Considering the trial court's findings and conclusions 
as a whole, the trial court's use of the phrase "suspended the 
imposition of sentence" in finding number three is a mis-
statement. It is undisputed in the record that the court imposed 
the sentence specified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990), 
e.g. a term of zero to five years (R. 30), see Addendum A. See 
also nn. 12-13, infra. Indeed, in the preceding finding number 
two, the court expressly recognized its imposition of the 
specified term of years. Thus, the court suspended the execution 
of sentence, rather than the imposition of sentence. This 
construction of the court's findings is also consistent with the 
court's ultimate determination that defendant was not entitled to 
have her third degree felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor 
precisely because sentence had been "imposed" (R. 57), see 
Addendum D. 
10
 The court's conclusion that it "executed" defendant's 
sentence is another apparent mis-statement and is also extraneous 
to the court's preceding, and more critical, determination that 
the specified felony sentence had been "imposed" (R. 57), see 
Addendum E. Construing the court's ruling in conjunction with 
the record, it is clear the court actually "suspended" the 
execution of the imposed felony sentence and then placed 
defendant on probation (R. 30-31), see Addendum A. 
IS 
B. Distinguishing the Imposition of Sentence 
From the Execution of Sentence For Purposes 
of the Reduction Statute 
Under either version of the reduction statute, a felony 
conviction may be considered to be for a misdemeanor if "the 
imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed 
on probation!.]" Section 76-3-402 (2) (b) (1990 & Supp. 1993) 
(emphasis added)-11 In the instant case, the trial court did 
not stay the imposition of defendant's third degree felony 
sentence for purposes of section 76-3-402(2) (b) (i) (Supp. 1993). 
Rather, the trial court imposed an indeterminate term of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 30), see Addendum A, as 
specified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990).12 The court 
11
 The 1991 amendments clarified that only a felony of the 
third degree was capable of reduction under subsection (2)(b), 
and that it could only be reduced to a class A misdemeanor. 
While subsection designations were also added in 
subsection 2(b), the operative language requiring a stay in the 
imposition of sentence, is the same in both the 1990 and amended 
versions of the statute. 
For reasons set forth in Point I, supra. the State's 
analysis proceeds under the amended version of the statute. 
12
 Section 76-3-203(3) provides: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third 
degree, for a term not to exceed five years 
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then suspended execution of that sentence and placed defendant on 
probation (R. 30-31), see Addendum A.13 
The distinction between a stay in the imposition of a 
sentence and a stay in the execution of a sentence is real, A 
trial court can withhold sentence either by staying its 
imposition or by staying execution of a sentence already imposed. 
Compare State v. Garnick. 619 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1980) 
(execution of defendant's one year jail sentence suspended and 
defendant placed on probation; thereafter, defendant's probation 
was revoked and the original jail sentence ordered executed) with 
State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873-74 (Utah 1979) (imposition of 
sentence continued until time of probation revocation; following 
which revocation "the judge imposed sentence of 0-5 years in the 
Utah State Prison"). 
13
 While it is true that probation can also be a sentence, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c) (Supp. 1993), section 76-3-
402(2)(b)(i) only makes sense when the term "sentence" as used 
therein is construed to mean the "sentence" specified for a third 
degree felony, i.e., a term of years. See section 76-3-203(3). 
To construe the subsection otherwise is to defeat its purpose. 
See RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n., 741 P.2d 948, 951 
(Utah 1987) ("a proper construction of the statute must further 
its purposes"); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.. 749 
P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988). See also Sutherland's Stat. Constr. § 4607 at 127 
(5th Ed.) (". . . words or clauses may be . . . restricted to 
harmonize with other provisions of an act. The particular 
inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what 
they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be 
understood or what understanding they convey when used in the 
particular act."). The only logical construction of subsection 
(2)(b)(i) is that the legislature intended to afford those 
defendants deemed acceptable for a probationary term (in lieu of 
imposition of sentence), and who also successfully completed that 
probationary term, an opportunity to have their third degree 
felony convictions reduced to class A misdemeanors. 
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The trial court's well recognized sentencing discretion 
is reflected in the probation statute, which reads in part: 
On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, 
no contest, or conviction of any crime or 
offense, the court may suspend the imposition 
or execution of sentence and place defendant 
on probation . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (3) (a) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). 
Another provision provides that " [i]f probation is revoked, the 
defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed 
shall be executed." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (e) (iii) (Supp. 
1993) ,14 
Moreover, the provision that preceded Utah's current 
probation statute provided that: 
Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any 
crime or offense, if it appears compatible 
with the public interest, the court having 
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or 
the execution of sentence and may place the 
14
 The legislature has distinguished between the 
imposition and the execution of sentence in other provisions of 
the code, though it has not defined either term. See, e.g.. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-406(1)(1990) ("probation shall not be granted, 
the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, . 
. . for any person who commits a felony of the first degree . . 
. " ) ; Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1(6) (Supp. 1993) ("The court may 
suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required 
under this section . . . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1) (Supp. 
1993) ("In a case involving rape of a child, aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child, or sodomy upon a child, the court may impose an 
indeterminate term for a first degree felony, or execution of 
sentence may be suspended and probation may be considered . . 
. " ) ; section 76-5-406.5(5) ("If the court finds a defendant 
granted probation under this section fails to cooperate or 
succeed in treatment or violates probation . . . the mandatory 
minimum sentence previously imposed for the offense shall be 
immediately executed."); section 76-5-406.5(6) ("A court may not 
modify the mandatory minimum sentence to an indeterminate term of 
five years to life and then suspend execution of that sentence 
and impose probation."). 
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defendant on probation for such period of 
time as the court shall determine. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953) (emphasis added). In construing 
this predecessor statute, the Utah Supreme Court said that "[t]he 
clear meaning of the words of the statute give the court the 
power to withhold sentence until such time as the court 
determines whether or not the prisoner is capable of 
rehabilitation and that this may be done upon his plea of 
guilty." State v. Fedder. 262 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1953). See 
also Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640# 641-43 (Utah 1944) 
(imposition of sentence suspended and defendant placed on 
probation on the condition that he "straighten out" or "come in 
and be sent to the penitentiary."). 
This sentencing discretion facilitates the trial 
court's "flexibility to deal with exceptional cases and evolving 
public sentiment." Utah Ct. R. Ann. (1993), Appendix D: Utah 
Sentence and Release Guidelines at p. 1129. Specifically, it 
affords trial courts the opportunity to relieve less culpable 
defendants of the stigma associated with the imposition of a 
felony sentence. See e.g.. Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d at 642-
43 (Utah Supreme Court observed that in staying the imposition of 
sentence the trial court was "endeavoring to save the youths from 
the stigma of prison. . . . It was dealing with juveniles; boys 
the court hoped to keep out of the penitentiary; doubtful cases, 
but worthy of care and consideration in the opinion of the trial 
judge."). A defendant whom the trial court does not consider to 
merit the imposition of the specified third degree felony 
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sentence, see subsection (2)(b)(i), may, upon the successful 
completion of probation, see subsection (2) (b) (ii) , and upon a 
finding that it is in the interest of justice, see subsection 
(2)(b)(iii), avoid having the original felony conviction recorded 
in his/her criminal history. In essence, a defendant qualifying 
for reduction under subsection (2)(b) benefits from a 
simultaneous expungement of the prior felony conviction. Thus, 
the legislature's use of the term imposition over the term 
execution in subsection (2)(b) represents more than a semantical 
choice. It is an express recognition of the trial court's broad 
sentencing discretion, in the "exceptional case," to spare a less 
culpable defendant the stigma of a third degree felony sentence. 
C. The Plain Language of the Reduction 
Statute Precludes Reduction Under the Facts 
of This Case 
The plain language of section 76-3-402(2)(b)(i) 
requires a stay in the imposition of the sentence, instead of a 
stay in the execution of the sentence. See Cox Rock Prod, v. 
Walker Pipeline Constr.. 754 P.2d 672, 675-76 (Utah App. 1988) 
("'We will interpret and apply [a] statute according to its 
literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable.") (citation omitted). See also Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 
185 (Utah 1945) (statutory interpretation "must be based on the 
language used, . . . and the court has no power to rewrite a 
statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed"). As 
defendant is not able to demonstrate that imposition of her 
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sentence was stayed, she is not entitled to relief under the 
plain terms of the statute. 
Defendant at no time argued below that hers was an 
"exceptional case," meriting a stay in the imposition of the 
specified third degree felony sentence and immediate placement on 
probation as required under subsection (2)(b). Rather, at the 
time of sentencing, defendant moved to have her original second 
degree felony conviction reduced to a third degree felony under 
section 76-3-402(1) (1990) (R. 29). The trial court granted that 
motion and imposed the specified third degree felony sentence (R. 
30-31) , see Addendum A. The court then suspended execution of 
that sentence and placed defendant on probation. Id.. 
Because sentence was imposed on defendant, it is 
irrelevant that she ultimately, successfully completed her 
probationary term. See section 76-3-402(2) (b) (ii). Upon the 
imposition of the specified felony sentence, defendant's 
opportunity for further reduction was foreclosed.15 As set 
forth in Part B, supra, subsection (2)(b)(i) recognizes the well 
established discretion of the trial court in "exceptional cases" 
to dispense with the imposition of the specified felony sentence 
15
 Additionally, as set forth in Point I (A) , supra, the 
amended statute clarifies that defendant, as one having 
previously benefitted by a one degree reduction at the time of 
sentencing (R. 30), see Addendum A, was precluded from having her 
conviction further reduced without the consent of the prosecutor, 
see section 76-3-402(3), which was not given in this case (R. 47-
54), see Addendum C. Thus, even if defendant could demonstrate 
that the imposition of her sentence was stayed under subsection 
(2)(b)(i), she would still be ineligible for reduction under 
subsection (3) because the prosecutor declined to consent. 
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and instead set the terms of a probationary period. As such, 
subsection (2)(b)(i) represents more than a semantical 
distinction, it is based on sound policy. Accordingly, the trial 
court correctly determined defendant was not entitled to further 
reduction under the plain terms of the statute and this Court 
should affirm that ruling. 
D. State v. Bagshaw Offers No Guidance to 
the Court 
Defendant argues that her case is factually 
indistinguishable from State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1386 
(Utah App. 1991), wherein this Court determined Bagshaw was 
entitled to have her two third degree felony convictions reduced 
to class B misdemeanors under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2) (b) 
(1990). As in this case, the trial court imposed the sentence 
specified for third degree felonies, an indeterminate term of 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for each of the two 
counts. Id. at 1384. The court then suspended those sentences 
and placed Bagshaw on probation. Id.. The similarity between 
this case and Bagshaw ends here. 
At issue in Bagshaw was the trial court's 
interpretation of "misdemeanor" and whether Bagshaw was entitled 
to have her convictions reduced to class A misdemeanors as the 
trial court had done, or further reduced to class B misdemeanors 
as defendant and the State initially agreed was required under 
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the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-104(2)16 and the 
1990 version of section 76-3-402(2) (b). Bagshaw, 836 P.2d at 
1385-86. The State agrees with the Court's disposition of 
Baashaw and its interpretation of the applicable statues insofar 
as section 76-3-104(2) controlled the definition of the term 
"misdemeanor" in section 76-3-402(2) (b). However, Baashaw did 
not address, or even recognize the distinction at issue here, 
between a stay in the imposition of sentence and a stay in the 
execution of sentence. Therefore, Baashaw offers no guidance to 
the Court in its resolution of this issue.17 
Defendant's reliance on Baashaw does not comport with a 
reasoned interpretation of the reduction statute and should be 
rejected. The language of the amended statute is identical to 
that of the previous provision erroneously applied in Baashaw; 
thus, it is important that this issue be clarified to prevent 
further confusion or misapplication of the statute by trial 
courts. 
16
 Section 76-3-104(2) provides: 
An offense designated a misdemeanor, either 
in this code or in another law, without 
specification as to punishment or category, 
is a class B misdemeanor. 
17
 Neither of the parties specifically addressed this 
issue prior to the issuance of the Baashaw opinion. For the 
first time in a petition for rehearing, the State recognized that 
the distinction between a stay in the imposition of sentence and 
a stay in the execution of sentence presented a more fundamental 
question concerning Bagshaw's eligibility for reduction under the 
statute, which question should have controlled the outcome in 
that case. The Court denied the State's petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's ruling 
denying defendant's motion to reduce her third degree felony 
conviction to a misdemeanor should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this32 day of August, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
I^AN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
JUB6EWERT | 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
SHIPLERj SHEILA J . 
DOB: 7/28/64 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
f Case No. omomsQQ TS 
I Count No. -E22 
> Honorable KENNETH RTGTRTTP 
C Clerk 
1 Reporter _ 
J Bailiff 
Date 
Constance George 
Carlton Way 
Stan Jacobson 
November 19, 1990 
p 
0 
• The motion of R.Scowcrafetonter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by a a jury; a the court; • plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of Theft , a felony 
of the -2nd. degree, O a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented Hyp. Rnwynf«- , and the State being represented hy T vvyY is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; &> \ > 0 \ d<Q> I 
fig' m not to exceed five years; (Suspended). r*r\ o * a c r 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; \ r d o i O * ^ 3 5 ^ 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years;
 m ^^ ^ ^,^ 
f ^ » and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_L^2£^° $ 6 0 ° - **J ™* ° « thru Comm/Ser at $5.1 
u-0 • 0 and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ T» to p*e»™** **T P Hfrrlng 
M $ ' * De f t t o pav $250 .00 Victim TtaatltiiMrwi A.QPQC 7 P P . ft $300 .00 B > ^ i p i n O T » VPP *n LDA 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with ^mammm^^mm^mmll^mil^^ 
• upon motion of • State, O Defense, O Court, Count(s) * & 3 are hereby dismissed. 
D 
fffc m Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 36 ffpnfrhg , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County O for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment 
D Commitment shall issue . . 
DATED this —^lsftay of Novemfer/ VLQ90 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^ DISTRICT^Ur^ JUDGE 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Defense Counsel 
1 ^ 2 Deputy County Attorney Page _ of 
».«..—*—e»*ta% 00030 
901901599 FS 
Judgment/State v. SHIPLER, SHEILA J. , C R ^Honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
ft-
9 Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept of Adult Probation & Parole. 
D Serve 
In the Salt Lake County Jail commencing _ _ _ _ 
Pay a fine in the amount of $1000*1 at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or D at the rate of ($600-00 may be worked off at the rate SglOO Hr.-
Pay restitution in the amount of $. 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of. 
^orCMnai ipgg nt to be determined by the Department 
Probation and ^ 
nentdt Adult 
£**£ 
. training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
; or D at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, (reserved for hearing) 
C Enter, participate in, and complete any ttentfll Healthy, program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, i ^ ^ * ^ h*L*ti*Z+ 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at . 
O Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or O vocational training O as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
O Participate in and complete any 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
O Submit to drug testing. 
Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
Take antabuse O as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
Maintain full-time employment. 
Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
O Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
O Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
ffe <L Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on. 
[tffM Ttefgndimfr » n p a y $ 7 0 0 . 0 0 PpmupPTnPT^f V P P tn T.TU 
j ^ y • TU>fPTiriaT>» »o p a y $ 7 5 0 OO V - f r M m F » « M f r i i M r * n A c c p c e ^ f V*« 
M' 
D 
O 
O 
D 
O 
O 
O 
• 
O 
a 
a 
o 
. for a review of this sentence. 
DATED this day of 
Page. of. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
f\ r\ r\ o * 
ADDENDUM B 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (#5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION JllTD ORDER TO 
: REDUCE CONVICTION TO 
Plaintiff, MISDEMEANOR 
v. : 
SHEILA J. SHIPLER, : Case No. 901901599FS 
: JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Defendant. 
The defendant, SHEILA J. SHIPLER, alleges: 
1. That on September 4, 1990, the defendant was 
charged by Information in the above-numbered case; 
2. That on October 22, 1990, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to the charge of Theft, a second-degree felony; 
3. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant was 
sentenced by this Court as a third-degree felony and placed on 
probation; and 
4. That on October 17, 1991, the defendant's 
probation was successfully terminated by this Court without 
violation. 
•A 
00036 
WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully moves this Court 
to reduce the conviction previously entered to a class B 
misdemeanor pursuant to the provisions of §§76*3-104(2) and 
76-3-402(2)(b) Utah Code Ann. (1990). 
DATED this day of December, 1992. 
ROGER K.^SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this *^s ^dav of December, 1992. 
<?~C«5 
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ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNIE JONES, Bar No. 1736 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
Tfti: uJuc.ua! District 
FEB 0 8 1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SHEILA J. SHIPLER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE 
DEGREE OF OFFENSE 
Case No. 901901599FS 
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup 
FACTS 
1. The defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty on 
October 22, 1990, of the offense of Theft, a second degree 
felony. 
2. On November 19, 1990, the defendant was sentenced by 
this Court. At that hearing, the Court granted the defendant's 
motion to enter conviction for the next lower category of offense 
and imposed upon the defendant a term in the Utah State Prison 
not to exceed five years, as provided for the offense of Theft, a 
third degree felony. 
nnnjio 
3. The Court then suspended the execution of the imposed 
sentence and placed the defendant on probation upon various terms 
and conditions. 
4. It appears that the defendant has been discharged from 
probation without having violated her probation. 
ISSUE ONE: 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 76-3-402 (2) HAVE NOT BEEN MET 
BY THIS DEFENDANT TO QUALIFY HER FOR REDUCTION OF CONVICTION 
Section 76-3-402 (2) (b) provides, that the conviction is 
considered or deemed to be a misdemeanor if "[t]he imposition of 
sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on probation . . . 
and he is thereafter discharged without violating her probation.11 
It is submitted that the staying of the ffimposition of 
sentence" is a term of art and is not synonymous with the staying 
of the execution of sentence; that it requires a specific, 
deliberate act by the judge at the time of sentencing before this 
portion of the statute can be invoked. 
Section 77-18-1 (2) UCA provides that, w[o]n a plea of 
guilty, • . •, or conviction of any crime or offense, the court 
may suspend the imposition OR execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation." [emphasis added] It is submitted that 
the legislature recognizes that there is a distinction between 
suspending the imposition and suspending the execution of a 
sentence. 
The case of WiUimns vy fiarrJP, 149 P.2d 640, (Utah, 1944), 
dealt with circumstances where the court, after conviction, 
suspended the imposition of sentence until a later date and 
placed the defendant in the custody of a Mr. Chi Ids. On that 
first date the court again suspended the imposition of sentence 
to another and then another and then another date. Before the 
last date, the defendant had been convicted of a new criminal 
offense. After what the appellate court determined was an 
appropriate hearing, the defendant admitted the violation and the 
court sentenced the defendant to a prison term. It was only at 
that last hearing, after the violation, that the Court stated 
what the term of incarceration for the defendant was to be. In 
holding that the court had acted properly, the Supreme Court 
stated, 
"The right to suspend imposition of sentence and 
the right to place one on probation is a discretionary 
right. One placed upon probation has a right to be 
heard as to whether he has violated the conditions upon 
which suspended sentence was based, [citations omitted] 
Upon such a hearing, the trial court has discretionary 
power to continue probation or impose sentence, but to 
authorize termination of probation there must be some 
competent evidence of violation of the terms of 
probation. Violation of the terms and conditions of 
suspension o[f] probation is usually a ground for 
revocation and the imposition of sentence.11 at 642. 
In another case, State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753 755 (Utah 
1953), the Utah Supreme Court quoted the then relevant statute 
nnnKft 
(77-35-7, UCA 1953), with the following emphasis, "'Upon a plea 
of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if it appears 
compatible with the public interest, the court having 
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution of 
sentence and may place the defendant on probation for such period 
of time as the court shall determine.' The clear meaning of the 
words of the statute give the court the power to withhold 
sentence until such time as the court determines whether or not 
the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation and that this may be 
done upon her plea of guilty." [underline is my emphasis, italics 
are original emphasis] 
It is submitted that this case clearly shows that there is a 
difference between suspending the imposition and execution of a 
sentence. 
The case of State v. Janis. 597 P. 2d 873 (Utah, 1979) 
involved a defendant who, after conviction, was given a 
sentencing date and two 90-day evaluations which were completed. 
At the sentencing date held after the last 90-day evaluation, 
91
 imposition of sentence was continued to October 18, 1976, and 
appellant was placed on probation.99 at 873. Subsequently, the 
defendant violated the terms of probation and an order to show 
cause why her probation should not be revoked was set. At that 
order to show cause, the defendant9s probations was revoked and 
"the judge imposed a sentence of 0-5 years in the Utah State 
Prison." at 874. In affirming the authority of the court to so 
sentence, the Supreme Court cited the then relevant sentencing 
authority of 77-35-7, UCA and Williams v. Harris. supra. 
In State v. Garnick. 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah, 1980), the Supreme 
Court dealt with a case where the facts included that the 
defendant plead guilty to a class A misdemeanor and, w[o]n 
November 28, 1978, defendant was sentenced to be confined to the 
Utah County Jail for a period of one year. Execution of the 
sentence was suspended and the was placed on probation . . ."at 
1384. 
It is submitted that the import of all these cases is that 
there is a difference between the suspension of the imposition 
and the suspension of the execution of a sentence. It is 
submitted that when a sentence is imposed when the term of 
imprisonment or incarceration is set. If no such term of 
imprisonment or incarceration is stated, then the imposition of a 
sentence is stayed. If the term of imprisonment is set, then the 
court can only suspend the execution of the imposed sentence. 
It is submitted that for Subsection (2) (b) to apply, the 
sentencing Court must have sentenced a defendant in a specific 
way. That specific way must have been that the imposition of 
sentence was stayed. That is, no term of imprisonment or 
incarceration must have been established as the punishment for 
the offense for which the defendant was sentenced. It is 
nnnsr* 
submitted that because this court did not, in the original 
sentencing of defendant on January 7, 1990, suspend the 
imposition but rather suspended or stayed the execution of the 
imposed sentence of not less than one nor more than fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison, the requirements of 76-3-402 (2) (b) 
have not been met and the defendant is not entitled to any 
reduction of the previously imposed judgment of conviction. 
CQNCfrUSJON 
It is submitted that defendant's Motion to Reduce Conviction 
should not be granted because the defendant is not entitled to 
such reduction, the requirements of Section 76-3-402 (2) (b) 
having not been met because the sentencing Court did not suspend 
the imposition of sentence. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 1992. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNIE JONES 
Deputy County Attorney 
hereby certify that *rue and correct copy o he 
foregoing Objection To Defendant's Motion To Reduce Degree 
Offense and Memorandum Opposition Defendant's Motion wu 
Reduce Degree o1 Offense was delivered to Roger K. Scowcroft, 
Attorney for Defendant Sheila J. Shipler, 424 East 500 South, 
the ___ day 
February, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM i 
I 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
8 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SHEILA o. SHIPLER, 
Defendant. 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 901901599 
SENTENCING, -19-90 
10 
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IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th d 
November, 1990, 2:30 o'clock p.m cause came 
on fo « re the HONORA KENNETH 
RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt 
nouse, Sa. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the State: TOM VUYK 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendant: ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney at Law 
FILED BISTWCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 13 693 
CAT b y : CARLTON \Y, CSR, R B A t i « _ A « . 
• * •-*•* *rwm 'imafi TbpUtyOmkY I 
r r-r 
1 COURT OF APPEALS 
n n A n *1 
1 y-y-ty-g-B-B-p-ir-ir-g-s 
21 THE COURT: State of Utah versus Sheila 
3 J. Shipler; File CR90-1599. 
41 The Court understands that you were 
5| originally charged with one count of Theft, a third 
61 degree felony; and two counts of Theft, second degree 
7 felonies; and pled guilty to one count of Theft, a 
81 second degree felony; is that true? 
91 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: Thereafter, the matter was 
111 referred to Adult Probation and Parole Department for 
12 a pre-sentence report. 
13 The Court has received such a report. 
14 Have you had an opportunity, 
15 Mr. Scowcroft, to review that? 
16 MR. SCOWCROFT: I have, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Have you had an adequate 
18 opportunity to review that with your client? 
19 MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes. 
201 THE COURT: You may address the issue of 
21 sentencing. 
22 MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 First of all, it's nice to get a report that puts 
24 someone in the Excellent category, recommends no 
2 51 incarceration. 
2 
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other hand, it's disturbing to me 
to see someone without criminal record burdened with 
•n very difficult c*i 
Sheila. She has pleaded guilty to a second degree 
an amount close $5,000. That's, in essence, in my 
op J n I n n n | I i' I HI i 11 I I lii ii ,i MI ii I 111 i i» -- there 
were three charges filed, as it was based on three 
months merely say that I -- a 
second degree felony, of course, is the highest level 
of theft there is. And for her to plead guilty on 
that, as I said, in essence, a plea as charged. 
We have submittec motion pursuan 
76-304-2 for the Court to consider sentencing _. _ 
lesser level of offense. 
As you know, there's a number c ways 
that the Court can proceed on that. The Court can do 
that right now. The Court could allow her to complete 
probation and entertain our motion *"> reduce this to a 
misdemeanor status after probation. 
T u
 k n o w doubt that she will fulfill 
probation without trouble. The restitution here is 
sizable. And I will address that issue next. 
We'd ask the Court take those matters 
into account. Because she has no criminal record, I 
1 feel she is someone who is deserving of that kind of 
21 consideration by the Court. 
31 In terms of restitution, your Honor, I 
4 talked to Jerry Turner in this case. He's the victim 
5 in this case. They've asked for four amounts here, 
6 amounts for the checks that were written, of 47, 36, 
7 76 and $539.77 per payroll; and then two amounts for 
81 auditing costs of theirs. 
91 In terms of the checks, your Honor, 
10 already one check for $500 has been deducted from that 
111 amount. The original allegation here was $5,236.76. 
12 They've taken one of those checks out that she wrote 
13 to herself, a five-hundred dollar check, that — which 
14 was, indeed, authorized. And I brought that to 
15 Mr. Turner's attention. So the 47, 36 is the full 
16 amount that they've requested here in terms of the 
171 checks that Miss Shipler wrote to herself. 
18 She has stated here, your Honor, that --
191 her story has been that she was party to these acts 
2Oi that she didn't know were criminal because one of the 
21 owners of the business authorized her to do it and 
221 told her to do it. And that — she told that to the 
231 presentence investigator right here in the report. 
24 That's in the report. He, Mr. Mercer, does address 
251 that issue. 
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I'm not here "" arguing, and 
I ll H I h lit' I I H t 
back . But the Court should know that least 
run Hi Minrr rhrrl'i I h r y nrlinUtpfl win nnthnr rrrlj 
that was a check written by herself. $539.75, 
your Honor, was payroll «*..»,-.... 
on confusion on her hourly rate of pay. 
this them, that victim's positioi 
suppose the position means most here, 
alleged that these were simply -- that this amount, 
the 500 7 was the result of confusion on hourly 
pay; whether it was six dollars, six, 50 or seven, 
25. 
They've also asked for restitution *.i 
the amount of 1 an 50 for bank research, and $1,354 
for auditing costs, they say, to investigate these 
crimes. T'- -"- certain whether those costs were 
indeed based on this event or whether those were just 
normal business expenses *-J' I'd ask the Court > 
take that into account and possibly not assessing her 
those costs. 
The -- she is working now. 
five dollars an hour, brings home about $150 every two 
w e e k e , I li i. ' L HI a i i J. u J . i u J j n L I 4 li l y u u 1 u J. L! LI I I \ 
nnn77 
1 from her first marriage. And the Court, I guess, has 
2 read the letters included in the presentence report 
31 from her mother and from her ex-husband. 
4| I'm sure you understand, your Honor, how 
51 hard this is on her* And I don't mean to minimize how 
61 hard it is on the other people, the victims who lost 
7 their money. And that's obviously true. But it is 
81 very hard on her. She's put her life on hold in this 
9 matter, and it's caused her a lot of pain and 
10 suffering to go through this. 
Ill My recommendations for sentencing, your 
12 Honor — I'm pleased with the presentence report. 
13 It's a good report. I don't think she ought to be 
14 incarcerated because I'm confident that she can 
15 perform adequately under probation. 
16 I'd ask the Court to consider waiving 
17 the fine in this case for community service because 
18 her income is limited. And I think she might be able 
19 to perform some community service in lieu of that 
20 fine. 
21 She will pay the money back in full, and 
22 I assume AP&P or any supervising authority would 
23 arrange for that. We would ask the Court to consider 
24 our motion to reduce this conviction under 76-340-2. 
25 We've submitted a motion. I think if a person who has 
6 
^v +% 4*K «•• ^ Tk 
1 
2 amends for interest burdening 
3 
4 Is there anything you want to say ' ~ the 
5 
6 THE DEFENDANT: 1 said what * sould say 
7 I I I! I .• 3 "1 1 .1 I .1" I o 
8 happen, that I even have to be here before yoi Bull I 
10 11 right. And I would like to get with my life. 
11 My lit!
 u i c e r n 0 w J ! • 3 t , 5 • B e C| c , , B t , ; ,. in , i 11 ]| e 
12 home life like he had. And that's that's my goals, 
13 :i s to make him and everyone around TO* know that I ' • i 
14 definitely not a troublemaker. I have no desire to 
151 cause any trouble for anyone. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Vuyk. 
17 MR. VUYK: We ask that you follow the 
18 presentence report. Mr. Jones has not stipulated nor 
19 agreed *-~ ~ reduction, and we would oppose it. 
20 THE COURT: You did indicate -- ~. at 
21 least the presentence report indicates -- «•»*-* your 
22 husband was aware of your involvement* 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me? 
24 THE COURT: The presentence report at 
251 one point indicates that your husband was aware " 
I 7 
1 your involvement at the time it was taking place? 
2 THE DEPENDANT: I believe Mr. Mercer 
3 just -- he spoke with me and asked me how my 
4 relationship is now. I just recently got married. 
51 And he said -- he says he has stood by me through all 
61 this. My understanding from reading that is that he 
71 knows the proceedings. Be knows what we are going 
81 through. He was aware of many things that, you know, 
9 went on at the place that I was employed at. And as I 
10 said before, it would take a long time to really tell 
111 you everything that went on on both sides. However, 
12 my husband is aware of everything that is going on as 
13 far as, you know, court dates, so forth, so on, 
14 everything. 
15 THE COURT: Is there any legal reason 
16 why the Court ought not to impose sentence at this 
17 time? 
18 MR. SCOWCROFT: I know of none, your 
19 Honor. 
20 THE COURT: The motion to reduce one 
21 step may be granted. The Court will sentence as a 
22 third degree felony. You will be sentenced to serve 
23 zero to five years in the Utah State Penitentiary. 
24 The Court will suspend that, place you on 36 months of 
25 probation on the following terms and conditions: That 
8 
1 , thousand dollar fine, two' hundred and fifty 
21 
3 off $600 five dollars per hour through community 
4| 
51 The Court will reserve the issue of 
71 would want some firm evidence on that. And the 
8 c oi" fJ! il :: t ill r ig statemer about the rate of payf I think, 
9 I ought to see in ~ greater scrutiny* 
10 expect you to contact the Court in 
111 a reasonable period c* time and make arrangements fu*. 
12 a hearing on that after you've had a chance ^~ do any 
13 discovery you want. 
14 MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You are to abide by the 
16 usual conditions of probation. You are x~ commit no 
17 crimes. You are to pay a recoupment fee of $200 
18 the Legal Defenders Association You're to maintain 
19 full-time employment. *va a t 
20 cards or checking accounts while on probation. And 
21 you are to undergo any mental health ev 
221 and/or treatments as directed from time time by 
23 Adult Probation and Parole Department. 
2 4 1) o i c>i :i understand those conditions? 
2 5 T H E D E F E N D A N 1 '" • i, ., I . 
L_ 
00081 
lj MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much. 
21 THE COURT: So if you'll follow through 
31 on the restitution? 
41 MR. SCOWCROFT: I will, your Honor. 
51 THE COURT: And advise the clerk that 
61 we'll need probably two hours. Make sure that the 
7 prosecutor has lead tine to get the victims lined up 
81 We'll have a brief hearing on it 
91 MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, 
10 your Honor. 
Ill (Hearing adjourned.) 
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(Monday, February 22, 1993, 3:00 p.m.) 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Sheila 
J. Shipler, CR90-1599. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Roger Scowcroft for 
Miss Shipler, your Honor. 
MR. JONES: Ernie Jones for the State. 
THE COURT: As I understand it, you've 
moved to reduce one degree lower; is that accurate? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Your Honor, I moved, 
pursuant to the 1990 version of 76-3-402 that's 
controling in this case because that is when the 
conduct occurred, under Subsection 2b, to reduce it to 
a misdemeanor. Under the Code, at that time, that 
would mean it would render it a class B misdemeanor. 
I don't -- you know, if the Court reduced it to an A, 
I wouldn't object. But I think that the law at that 
time would mandate that the court, if the person 
satisfies the conditions of successful completion 
without violation, mandates that it be reduced to a 
misdemeanor, which would be a class B misdemeanor. 
I had an opportunity to review the 
State's memorandum, and I'm prepared to briefly 
respond to that. 
My position on the motion is, once 
11 
again, that it is mandatory based upon Miss Shipler9s 
conduct in this case; that is, that she completed 
probation without violation. She -- incidentally, she 
has no other criminal history, paid restitution in the 
amount of about $6,000, completed her probation 
without a violation. She's a young person with a lot 
of potential. And, of course, this, I think, means a 
lot to her ability to make a living, get a good job, 
other sorts of burdens that a felony conviction 
creates for people. 
So that's our position on the motion, 
your Honor. I am prepared, I think, to respond to the 
State's memorandum, if Mr. Jones would like to present 
it to the Court, or however. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones* 
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, I'm not so 
concerned about the memorandum. As you recall, the 
Defendant now cites 76-3-402 as the basis to reduce 
this conviction. 
As the Court may recall at the time of 
sentencing in this case, which was back, I believe, in 
November, 1990, he filed a similar motion, an oral 
motion to the Court, to reduce this from a second 
degree motion (sic) to a third; and the Court granted 
that motion. 
12 
nnn© M 
It's our position that Defendant can't 
cone in and use Section 402 for a second tine. In 
other words, what he's doing is filing a notion at the 
tine of sentencing to reduce it one degree, and now 
he's coning back at the conclusion of probation and 
trying to invoke the sane statute again. I don't read 
the statute as allowing a defendant two bites at the 
apple, to allow then to reduce the conviction once at 
sentencing and again at the conclusion of probation. 
In fact, as I read the language in the 
statute, I think it specifically precludes that. If 
you look at Subsection 3 of the statute -- under 
76-3-402, Subsection 3 says: 
"An offense nay be reduced only one 
degree under this section, unless the prosecutor 
specifically agrees in writing or on the court record 
that the offense nay be reduced." 
And I think that's why the language is 
in there. I don't think the legislature ever intended 
a defendant to be able to reduce their conviction 
twice, once at sentencing and again. 
As you nay recall, frequently at the 
tine of sentencing we have this notion nade, and a lot 
of tines the court will take the notion under 
advisenent until we conclude probation and then grant 
13 
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1 it if there's no further problems. But in this 
2 situation where the Defendant made a motion at the 
31 time of sentencing and it was granted, I just don't 
4 think you can come in again and cite that same statute 
51 and reduce the case for a second time. 
6| So that's the basis for our opposing the 
71 motion now to reduce it another degree. 
81 THE COURT: Does she have any other 
9 criminal convictions? 
10 MR. JONES: Not that I am of aware of. 
11 MR. SCOWCROFT: Can I respond to — 
121 THE COURT: Just a minute. 
13 MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. 
14 THE COURT: What harm is done? 
15 MR. JONES: Well, I just don't think 
16 that's what the statute's ever designed for, Judge. I 
17 just don't think we are — 
181 THE COURT: I understand. That is not 
191 the question. 
201 MR. JONES: The harm that it is done is 
21 the fact that this woman stole six thousand dollars, 
22 she's being prosecuted, she entered a guilty plea and 
23 we imposed a sentence. 
24 THE COURT: Has she paid it back? 
251 MR. JONES: As far as I know, she has. 
14 
But I don't think it is a question of complying. It 
is a question of how we are interpreting the statute 
and what we are doing with the statute. To me, we are 
just totally distroying the purpose for the statute if 
we are going to allow defendants two chances to reduce 
their convictions. 
Certainly, the statute allows for them 
to expunge their record, but they've got to wait — I 
think it is -- five years before they come in and do 
that. 
I just don't think the statute was ever 
designed to give them two different chances to reduce 
their conviction. 
THE COURT: Do you make motions in the 
interest of justice on occasion? 
MR. JONES: Do we make motions in the 
interest of justice? 
THE COURT: Do you on occasion? 
MR. JONES: I think it depends on the 
situation. But, that's what Z say --
THE COURT: I mean, that is the 
question. Do you — 
MR. JONES: I guess Z don't understand 
what you are saying. 
THE COURT: Do you, on occasions, make 
15 
00087 
1 motions in the interest of justice? 
21 MR. JONES: You mean like to dismiss a 
3 case? 
41 THE COURT: Sure. 
51 MR. JONES: Yes, in some situations. 
61 TEE COURT: Or to reduce, or whatever? 
71 MR. JONES: Yes. But I don't see that 
81 as applying to this situation. I mean, we've got a 
9 statute that specifically provides for reduction of 
101 convictions. And it just seems to me she's already 
111 made that motion at the time of sentencing. 
12 MR. SCOWCROFT: Can I respond? 
13 First of all, the 1990 statute that 
141 applies in this case does not contain the language 
151 cited by Mr. Jones including a two-step reduction. 
16 The statute was amended in '91, and that language was 
17 inserted then. The version I have given to you. 
18 And, Mr. Jones, the 1990 statute, does 
19 not contain that language. 
20 THE COURT: Does it use the language, 
21 "Imposition"? 
22 MR. SCOWCROFT: It says, quote, under 
231 Subsection 2: 
24 "Whenever a conviction is for a felony, 
25 the conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor 
16 
if" — 
And then Subsection a says: 
"Designates the sentence to be a 
misdemeanor, which was the purpose of the motion — 
the written motion we filed at sentencing." 
But under Subsection b, a different 
statute, it says: 
"If the imposition of the sentence is 
stayed and the defendant is placed on probation, 
whether committed to jail or as a condition of 
probation or not, and he is thereafter discharged 
without violating his probation" — 
THE COURT: Isn't that the subsection 
that we are dealing with? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: That is. And that is a 
different section from that utilized by the Court to 
sentence Miss Shipler to a third degree felony after 
she pled guilty to a second degree felony* 
The Court could have sentenced her to a 
Class A misdemeanor under the 1990 version of the Code 
at the time of sentencing, which was the purpose of 
the motion that we made. That's what we were seeking 
at that time* The Court could have done it at that 
time. The Court could have taken it under advisement, 
and done it now. But there's no statute precluding a 
17 
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1 further reduction. And my reading of the statute is, 
2 in fact, that it's mandatory. But I think this is a 
31 person who, in the interest of justice, deserves it, 
41 if anyone does. 
51 THE COURT: You cause me to be more 
61 reflective about reducing at the time of sentencing. 
71 MR. JONES: My understanding was that 
81 she didn't file this motion for this reduction until 
9 October/November of 1991. And this statute that I 
10 just cited was in effect. 
Ill MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, yes. 
12 MR. JONES: You are going to be able to 
13 take the best of both worlds, and say: "We want to 
14 use the '90 statute in this situation and the '91 in 
15 the next situation.19 
16 MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, 76-1-103 of the 
17 Code, "Application of Code, Offense prior to effective 
18 date" — got a copy of that, and I've given you a 
19 copy, your Honor -- does say that: 
20 "Offenses. Sentencing of offenses is 
21 governed by the law in effect at the time of the 
22 offense." 
23 And I've got the Code section here* And 
24 I'll just give you a copy. Judge, if you want to take 
25 a look at that. 
18 
nnnoft 
II My reading is that the 1990 statute 
2 applies because the offense occurred in 1990. 
3 THE COURT; 141 deny the motion. 
41 MR. SCOWCROFT: Would the Court issue 
51 written findings? 
61 TEE COURT: I'm just construing the 
71 statute. I executed on the sentence. I didn't 
8] suspend the imposition of the sentence. 
9 MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, let me — the 
101 State didn't argue that, Judge. They seemed not to 
111 make that argument. That's in the memorandum. If I 
12 can briefly address that issue? The State seems to be 
13 arguing — 
14 THE C O U R T : I read their b r i e f . 
15 MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. Would the Court 
16 issue findings? Because we need written findings, I 
17 think. 
18 THE C O U R T : No, I am just applying the 
19 statute. I'm making no findings. I guess you can 
20 make a finding that I did execute on the sentence. I 
21 didn't suspend imposition of the sentence. I 
221 concluded that Subsection b appliesi and, accordingly, 
23 it's not applicable and denied the relief. 
24 MR. SCOWCROFT: All right. I need 
251 written findings to pursue this. And I just ask that 
19 
the Court have them --
THE COURT: The only finding that I'm 
aware of is that basically that that's the section 
under which you move. My order earlier was an 
execution of the sentence, not a suspension of 
imposition of sentence. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: The problem with that 
Judge — and I don't mean to argue with you, and I 
won't take up your time. But that argument would 
require that a sentence never even be imposed. If 
there's a difference between suspending and staying, 
you'd never ask to reduce a conviction if it were 
never entered. 
THE COURT: As frivolous as it was, I 
bought it. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: All right. Well, I 
think -- I would request that the State prepare 
findings. I will need written findings, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I guess if you want 
findings, I am not going — I told you the extent to 
which I will find, and that's all. If you want to 
just briefly state that and submit it to Mr. Jones 
before it comes over --
MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. And so the 
Court's finding, just so I am clear on this, is 
20 
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1 that... 
21 THE COURT: I executed sentence. I did 
31 not suspend imposition of sentence. 
4 MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the Court did 
5 suspend it. Now, the statute says "stayed" --
61 THE COURT: I suspended execution on any 
71 confinement. 
81 MR. SCOWCROFT: All right. 
9 THE COURT: And placed her on probation 
10 on the following terms and conditions. 
11 MR. SCOWCROFT: And so — 
12 THE COURT: The only thing I suspended 
13 was the execution on any prison sentence. 
14 MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. The Court's 
15 ruling is that because the imposition of sentence was 
16 not stayed, is that correct, that the subsection does 
17 not apply? 
18 THE COURT: Right. 
19 MR. SCOWCROFT: I'll prepare findings, 
201 then, and submit them to the Court. 
21 THE COURT: I think that's what 
22 Mr. Jones said in his brief. That's why* I read it. 
23 And that is the basis of my ruling. 
24 MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much. 
251 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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ADDENDUM E 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTI^T 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
SHEILA SHIPLER, : Case No. 901901599FS 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Defendant. : 
The defendant's Motion to Reduce Conviction to Misdemeanor 
came before this Court for hearing on February 22, 1993, at the hour 
of 2:00 p.m. The defendant was represented by her attorney, 
Roger K. Scowcroft, and plaintiff State of Utah was represented by 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Ernest W. Jones. Having heard the 
arguments of the parties, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on October 22, 1990, the defendant entered a plea 
of "guilty" to the charge of Theft, a second-degree felony; 
2. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant was sentenced 
as a third-degree felony, pursuant to the provisions of 
§76-3-402(1), Utah Code Ann. (1990), to serve, inter alia, the 
statutory term of zero-to-five years incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison; 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 0 9 1993 
00058 
3. That on November 19, 1990, the Court suspended the 
imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on probation; and 
4. That on October 17, 1991, the Court terminated the 
defendant's probation as successful without violation. 
WHEREFORE, having made these Findings of Fact, the Court 
now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. The defendant's Motion to Reduce Conviction to 
Misdemeanor is hereby denied on the grounds that §76-3-402(2)(b), 
Utah Code Ann. (1990), does not authorize reducing defendant's 
conviction to a misdemeanor because the imposed sentence was 
executed by the Court. 
~*W\ 
DATED this day of March, 1993. 
BY THE yCOURT: 
HONORABLE KENN 
Third District Cou: 
Approved as to Fo: 
^ 
ERNEST W. JON! 
Deputy Salt ^ake County Attorney 
00057 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this V day of March, 1993, : i S _ ^ 
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ROGER K. SCOWCROFT (5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SHEILA SHIPLER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 901901599FS 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
previously made and entered by this Court, the defendant's Motion to 
Reduce Conviction to Misdemeanor is HEREBY DENIED. 
DATED this °] day of March, 1993. 
BY THE (COURT: 
HONORABLE KENNETH/RIGTflUP 
Third District Cot 
Approved as to Form: 
/irft*-
ERNEST W. JONI 
Deputy Salt L^ke County Attorney 
00059 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this / day of March, 1993. 
<^Z7C^r<^)C 
nnnc-fi 
